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Abstract 
China has been marked as a source country from which large volumes of precursor chemicals 
are shipped to foreign drug markets for synthetic drug production. However, the basic 
patterns of illicit distribution remain unclear. Data from closed criminal cases were extracted 
from legal files to develop an objective understanding of illicit distribution patterns in China. 
The sample consisted of 534 illicit supply cases involving 1481 individuals, three groups of 
precursor chemicals and 102 chemical manufacturing companies. The offenders could be 
categorised as lower-class offenders, occupational offenders and corporate offenders based 
on their profiles and criminal behaviours. Significant differences between the three groups of 
offenders and their specific patterns of chemical supply suggest a diverse, dynamic and 
complex nationwide supply network. To better understand this phenomenon in China’s 
rapidly transitioning society, we provide a description of cultural, legal and political 
backgrounds, which may provide some explanations at the macro level. 
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Introduction 
In recent research and official documents, China has been regarded as a source country from 
which a large volume of precursor chemicals is transported to foreign countries for synthetic drug 
production (EMCDDA 2016; King and Kicman 2011; Norman, Grace and Lloyd 2014; Seddon 
2014). This is plausible to foreign scholars and governments because hundreds of metric tonnes 
of precursors, confiscated by foreign law enforcement agencies, are shipped by legitimate 
enterprises in China to other countries (EMCDDA 2017). Is this a truth based on findings in certain 
cases or simply a social stigma based on the large amount of seizures? Answers to this question 
should be based on evidence from the illicit distribution network of precursor chemicals in China. 
However, this network has remained hidden. 
 
The brief history of the illicit production and distribution of controlled chemicals in China dates 
back to the early 1980s, when the country introduced economic market structure reforms, 
opening its borders to the world. With these reforms, synthetic drugs from the Golden Triangle 
and Golden Crescent were smuggled into China for the first time (Chu and Levy 2005; Lu, Fang 
and Wang 2008; Zhao et al. 2004). Simultaneously, the reforms also opened the illicit supply of 
precursor chemicals for the production of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) from China to 
other countries and districts, particularly those in the Golden Triangle. However, this illicit supply 
of precursor chemicals for local drug production was not exposed until 1991, when the first 
synthetic drug production facility in Guangdong province, one of the most open and developed 
districts in China, was dismantled. Subsequently, the distribution networks of precursor 
chemicals became more diverse and complex, even as authorities imposed controls on illicit drug 
distribution. In fact, China’s trafficking of precursor chemicals to local and foreign drug producers 
and the smuggling of synthetic drugs to China are widely acknowledged to have developed into a 
stable and bidirectional cycle (Chen and Huang 2007). 
 
Geographically, the production and smuggling of precursor chemicals is concentrated in border 
provinces, including Xinjiang in the north and Yunnan and Guangdong in the south, which are 
directly related to Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle, respectively (Clarke 2008). 
Approximately 98.8 per cent of ephedrine seized while being smuggled into other countries in 
2000 came from Yunnan province; 66.5 metric tonnes of acetic anhydride being smuggled into 
Afghanistan were confiscated by law enforcement agencies in Xinjiang in the same year (NNCCC 
2000). From 2005, trafficking routes became more complex and diverse in response to regulatory 
controls over ephedrine through a series of special campaigns against the illicit distribution of 
ephedrine in these border provinces. As a result, drug producers and dealers turned to inland 
provinces with fewer or no anti-ephedrine activities to collect the herbal precursors for 
ephedrine extraction. Trafficking routes at this stage were characterised by extensive acquisition 
of ephedra plants from remote provinces including Shanxi, Hebei and Inner Mongolia, to be sold 
to both local and foreign producers in Burma and the Golden Triangle. Most recently, with drug 
producers discovering new ways to synthesise ephedrine from precursor chemicals, illicit 
chemical production facilities have spread quickly, particularly in Chinese suburbs and rural 
areas, which may indicate that the illicit supply of chemicals has overcome geographical 
constraints. 
 
Additionally, to exploit the differing legal status of chemicals, drug producers adopted innovative, 
alternative methods to synthesise drugs from various legal chemicals, thereby circumventing the 
law. In the early 2000s, ephedrine was the main precursor for producing methamphetamine, the 
most common drug in China’s drug markets. After the stringent control of ephedrine and ephedra 
plants, synthesising ephedrine from legal chemicals such as α-Bromopropiophenone1 had been 
the primary method for methamphetamine production (NNCCC 2015). Moreover, some chemical 
and pharmaceutical companies further attempted other innovations to synthesise pre-precursors 
and precursors from various kinds of medicines and legal chemicals and continued selling their 
products to local and foreign drug producers for the production of ATS and new psychoactive 
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substances (NPS). This appeared to be legal, or at least not criminal, and it was easy to accrue 
wealth within a brief period. 
 
Similarly, some individuals with specialised knowledge of chemicals, such as chemists and mid-
level employees of chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises, were involved in these parallel 
markets to earn money easily and quickly, which diversified distributors’ backgrounds. This 
pattern was quite different from those noted by early research, which described most drug 
traffickers as poorly educated people with few employable skills or alternatives for making 
money (Chin and Zhang 2012).  
 
It is notable that there remains an increasing trend of gun-violence involvement in drug 
trafficking in 29 provinces (NNCCC 2017), but few signs of such violence were reported in early 
research on illicit chemical distribution networks (Miao and Zhang 2002; Qin and Fang 2006; 
Yang and Tian 2000). In the early 1980s, when there were no ATS production facilities in China, 
chemicals intended for smuggling to the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent were concealed by 
changing the packaging, relabelling, mixing with legitimate products and cloaking in frontier 
trades (Chen and Huang 2007; Yao 2015). With the increasing demand for ATS in mainland China 
in the 1990s, foreign criminal organisations started building facilities in southern provinces for 
drug production, concealed under the name of foreign investments, to take advantage of 
abundant sources of ephedra plants and chemicals through covert and nonviolent means (NNCCC 
2000). The most recent research and official documents from closed cases show that violent 
resistance extended towards the downstream drug sale network and endpoint of consumption 
(NNCCC 2017) rather than upstream illicit activities such as precursor chemical production and 
distribution. 
 
Existing research has captured and summarised some patterns of illicit distribution activities 
such as trafficking routes, specific chemicals frequently involved and the Internet usage in supply 
chains (Qin 2011; Zhang and Liu 2014; Zhao 2010). However, the evidence used to reach these 
conclusions has not been voluminous enough to definitively support them, and supply patterns 
still require timely updates. As noted by Moore (1990), to improve supply reduction efforts and 
accomplish drug policy objectives, we must identify the key factors of production and distribution 
in long-term supply, and address these factors. 
 
The primary aim of this research is to describe and summarise the key patterns of the illicit supply 
of precursor chemicals with reliable information from sentencing files in China. This is followed 
by a macro-level analysis of the phenomenon by referring to the penetration of market economies 
into other institutions under institutional anomie theory (IAT), which was developed by Messner 
and Rosenfeld (2012). A core argument of IAT is that institutional arrangements in which the 
market economy is allowed to dominate without restraints from other institutional spheres, 
comprise an ‘institutional imbalance of power’, which further generates deviance at a macro level. 
With regard to modern Chinese society characterised by rapid transition, many changes caused 
by the development of the market economy have been noticed. It appears that the economy is 
allowed to penetrate other institutions, such as culture, polity and law. This subsequently results 
in an imbalance between different institutions and imposes general strains on certain groups in 
society. As Liu (2004) noted, the transition from state socialism to a market economy in China has 
been a fundamental social change that has resulted in increased crime. Therefore, it seems that 
there are many inherent consistencies between the IAT and Chinese transitional society. 
However, it should be considered that the IAT was developed using the United States (US) as a 
basis. The US is quite different from China in terms of culture, economy, education and family. 
Thus, the theory cannot be applied in entirety to explain the causes of crime in Chinese society. 
Based on these considerations, rather than exhausting all institutional arrangements, we only 
focus on the penetration of the market economy into the cultural, political and legal contexts 
relevant to the behaviours of the three catergorised offenders. This may contribute substantially 
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to an improved understanding of the relationships between the illicit supply of chemicals and 
economic, cultural, legal and political contexts. 
 
Method 
To address the central research concern—the illicit supply of precursor chemicals in China—this 
study was primarily based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of sentencing files. The 
quantitative analysis focused mainly on statistical features regarding the profiles of offenders, 
types of chemicals and relationships between different variables in sentencing files. 
Simultaneously, a qualitative analysis was conducted to extract key information on how and why 
these differences and associations exist. All sentencing files were imported in NVivo and broadly 
coded in the first phase. Particular fragments of confessions and legal facts were linked to topics 
and discourses. After processing all materials, the ‘nodes tree’, the result of the initial coding, was 
reviewed. During the revision, separate nodes were analysed. The content of each node was 
compared with that of other nodes to improve categorisation and links to quantitative results and 
literature. Both methods were utilised to derive a description of key patterns in the supply chain, 
including profiles of offenders, distribution routes, specific chemicals involved and illicit business 
operation modes. 
 
Data 
Closed criminal cases of illicit supply (production, distribution, trafficking, transporting and 
smuggling) in the past six years (2012–2017) in China were collected from an official database,2 
China Judgment Online, which was established and maintained by the Supreme People’s Court of 
the People’s Republic of China in 2013.3 Given the aim of this research—to describe basic supply 
patterns in China—we only focused on cases that were brought to trial according to Article 3504 
of the criminal law. Notably, this step narrowed our search scope and excluded some potential 
cases. This is because providing illicit supplies of precursor chemicals is regarded as a drug 
offence if offenders acknowledge that the chemicals they provide is to be used for drug 
production. We also limited the types of legal documents to judgments and excluded conciliations, 
criminal rulings and orders. Moreover, we set no limit on court level. We conducted the database 
search process on 1 January 2018 with the following settings: 1) criminal category; 2) conviction 
based on Article 350 of criminal law; 3) occurred between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017; 
and 4) keywords include precursor chemicals and raw materials. The search process captured 
534 closed cases, of which 522 cases involved the illegal production of and dealing in precursor 
chemicals; 12 cases involved smuggling precursor chemicals. 
 
Variables and analysis process 
To present objective supply patterns, the following offender variables were collected: number of 
members, men, women, highest education background, occupation, young adults and criminal 
record. Specifically, the number of members refers to the number of individuals in each case, 
which was further divided into three scales: scale 1 (S1), scale 2 (S2) and scale 3 (S3), 
corresponding to 1–3, 4–6 and 7 or more members, respectively. Men and women refer to the 
number of males and number of females in the cases. Highest education background means the 
highest education level completed by all offenders in each case; this was coded as 0 = illiterate, 
1 = elementary school, 2 = high school, 3 = bachelor’s degree and above, and 4 = unknown. 
Occupation refers to the number of individuals belonging to the three groups of occupations in 
accordance with their social and economic status; the first group (O1) comprised peasants, 
unemployed and self-employed individuals; the second group (O2) consisted of administrative 
staff, chemical experts and other employees in chemical companies; and the third group (O3) 
comprised general managers and legal representatives of chemical companies. Young adults 
refers to the number of individuals aged 18–40 years in accordance with the scope of youth 
defined by the All-China Youth Federation. Criminal record means the number of individuals who 
had previously committed criminal offences. 
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The sum of these variables, including men, women, occupation, young adults and criminal record 
was calculated in all cases. At the same time, the frequency of highest education background was 
recorded. 
 
Chemical variables consisted of chemicals, quantity and company involvement. Chemicals were 
divided into three groups according to their practical use: C1 = ephedrine and input chemicals, 
for the production of methamphetamine; C2 = hydroxylamine hydrochloride and input 
chemicals, for the production of ketamine; and C3 = other chemicals (such as hydrochloric acid 
and sulphuric acid). Quantity is the amount of chemicals in each case; it was coded as 1 = 1–
100 kg; 2 = 101–1,000 kg; 3 = 1,001–5,000 kg; and 4 = 5,001 kg and above. Company 
involvement refers to the extent to which chemical manufacturing companies were involved: no 
involvement, passive involvement and positive involvement. No involvement means chemicals 
were illicitly supplied by offenders in O1, passive involvement means chemicals were illicitly 
supplied by employees of chemical manufacturing companies (i.e., offenders in O2), and positive 
involvement refers to corporate crimes committed by offenders in O3. On this basis, all cases were 
divided into three groups: group 1 (G1), no involvement; group 2 (G2), passive involvement; and 
group 3 (G3) positive involvement. 
 
Chi-squared and one-way ANOVA tests were conducted between G1, G2 and G3 to measure the 
statistical differences and relations between company involvement and other variables. 
Subsequently, we conducted further tests among the three different groups to measure potential 
relationships between variables. 
 
Results 
 
We collected the key factors of 534 sentencing files, from 2012–2017. As shown in Table 1 below, 
the number of cases was quite limited in 2012, but increased dramatically in the following two 
years, reaching its peak in 2014. There were 1,481 individuals involved in the illegal supply of 
controlled chemicals. Most were male (96.6 per cent) and self-employed businesspeople, 
peasants and unemployed individuals (82.5 per cent). A total of 157 staff members were involved 
in cases and most of them were concentrated in 2013–2015. Only 102 managers were involved 
in the illicit supply of chemicals. The number of individuals with prior criminal records was 74 
and mainly concentrated in 2014–2016. The chemicals were divided into three groups, of which 
ephedrine and input chemicals accounted for 46.4 per cent, followed by other chemicals, 
comprising 40.8 per cent of cases. Hydroxylamine hydrochloride and input chemicals only 
accounted for 12.8 per cent. 
 
Table 1: Individuals involved in the illegal supply of controlled chemicals 2012-2017. Total =     
1,481 
Variables in statistics 
Year 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017(Jan-Sep) Total 
Young adults - 59 147 159 111 39 515 
Men 2 171 506 457 223 72 1431 
Women 0 8 20 11 7 4 50 
Lower-class 
individuals 
1 133 437 393 196 62 1222 
Staff 1 26 51 50 21 8 157 
Managers 0 20 39 25 12 6 102 
Criminal Record 0 6 16 23 19 10 74 
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Tests between the three groups, including G1, G2 and G3, were conducted. As shown in Table 2, 
statistically significant differences were found between groups with respect to the number of 
members, men and women. There were also statistical differences between the groups regarding 
chemicals, highest educational background and quantity. 
 
 
Table 2: Statistical differences between groups. 
 
Tests comparing the scale of members (S1, S2 and S3) and other variables within the three groups 
suggested that, in G1, there were significant differences regarding young adults 
(F[2,233] = 218.105, p. < 0.01), women (F[2,376] = 5.723, p. < 0.01), and criminal records 
(F[2,376] = 3.834, p. < 0.01) between different scales. The Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that 
women in S1 (0.04 ± 0.19) were significantly lower than they were in S2 (0.16 ± 0.51, p. <0.01). 
However, there were no significant differences between other groups. The test also suggested 
that criminal records in S1 (0.12 ± 0.37) were only significantly lower than they were in S3 
(0.37 ± 1.01, p. < 0.01). In G2, there was a statistically significant difference in criminal records 
(F[2, 86] = 4.125, p. < 0.01) between different scales. The criminal records in S1 (0.07 ± 0.25) 
were significantly lower than they were in S2 (0.42 ± 0.90, p. < 0.01). However, such a difference 
was not observed between S1 and S3 or between S2 and S3. In G3, the number of young adults in 
S3 (6.17 ± 5.26) was significantly higher than it was in S1 (0.88 ± 0.99, p. < 0.01) and S2 
(2.20 ± 2.05, p. < 0.01). Such a difference was not found between S1 and S2. 
 
Categorised offenders 
Given the statistical differences and prominent features regarding criminals and criminal 
behaviours between groups, we tried to develop a typological construction consisting of lower-
class offenders, occupational offenders and corporate offenders. 
 
Lower-class offenders 
Offenders in G1, including self-employed businesspeople, peasants and unemployed individuals, 
were categorised as lower-class offenders. As shown in Table 2, profiles of offenders and supply 
patterns in this group, including men, women, number of members, highest educational 
background, chemicals and quantity were significantly different from the other two groups. The 
most frequent response among them for highest education was high school; the proportion with 
a higher education background was quite limited, which suggests a low education level among 
members. The occupations of offenders in this group reflect relatively lower social status and 
unstable income. Such profiles are consistent with early research that argued that most drug 
traffickers were farmers, businesspeople and workers who were male, poor and not well 
educated (Chen and Huang 2007; Huang et al. 2012; Qin 2011). 
 
 
Number of 
members 
Gender  Education  Occupation Chemicals Quantity 
S1 S2 S3 Men Women 0 1 2 3 4 O1 O2 O3 C1 C2 C3 1 2 3 4 
Chemical 
company 
involvement 
G1 288 64 27 962 25 1 30 238 14 96 987 0 0 225 62 92 83 172 56 68 
G2 73 12 4 228 5 0 1 48 6 34 130 103 0 14 3 72 5 29 21 34 
G3 45 12 9 241 20 0 0 27 10 29 105 54 102 7 3 56 4 7 13 42 
Total 406 88 40 1431 50 1 31 313 30 159 1222 157 102 246 68 220 92 208 90 144 
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The scale of the members in this group showed no significant difference compared to G2 and G3. 
However, between the scales within the group, there were some significant differences. As 
suggested by the results, in this group, women were more likely to engage in medium scales with 
4–6 members compared to S1 and S3. The number of members with criminal records seemed to 
be distributed evenly across the three scales. The structure of members in the three scales is 
difficult to measure through statistical analysis. However, the qualitative analysis indicated that 
there were always relationships between members (i.e., through friendships, neighbourhoods, 
native place and kin). Such relationships brought them together with relatively high trust, but 
provided no foundation for a hierarchical order among members. As several offenders convicted 
in the sentencing files noted, ‘I join them for help and to a less extent, for some money’; ‘we are 
friends, he wants to rent my farm, and I do not care what he do with it’; and ‘if I know it is crime, 
I never help him’.5 Therefore, the groups were not stable, and might have disbanded when they 
finished their business. 
 
Most crimes committed by these offenders were related to the illicit supply of ephedrine, which 
is a precursor for methamphetamine. Ephedrine was frequently noted as being produced in 
workshops6, laboratories and even kitchens in the countryside.7 For example: 
 
Case 1:8 On 15 April 2015, defendants Chen and Hua conspired to produce ephedrine. Chen contacted 
his friend, defendant Ye, to help him search for a hidden location to produce ephedrine. With the help 
of Ye, Chen leased a hoggery in Xishan Village, Tong’an District for 10 days at a rent of RMB 30,000. 
Ye received RMB 10,000 from Chen. Later, Chen and Hua called on their friends, the other three 
defendants, to buy tools and raw materials needed to manufacture ephedrine. They also called on a 
number of masters to hike up the mountain with them, and began to produce ephedrine. 
 
In some cases, legal medicines—such as Contac NT—purchased on the Internet from chemical 
companies and pharmacies in rural areas where use of ephedrine was unsupervised, were also 
used as raw materials to produce ephedrine. The knowledge and methods for manufacture were 
learned from, and developed through, the Internet. Instant messaging software like QQ and 
WeChat and the Internet forums like Tianya and Baidu were used to share information on 
precursor chemicals and substitutive pre-precursors (Hao and Zhao 2012). 
 
All smuggling cases in our database were committed by lower-class individual groups. There 
were two basic smuggling routes: South Asia—China—South-East Asia, and South Asia—China—
Oceania. The smuggling of ephedrine from South Asia via China to South-East Asia was quite fixed, 
which supports the findings of earlier research on the stability of the transportation of chemicals 
from Tibet to Yunnan and finally to the Golden Triangle (Qin and Fang 2006). New Zealand and 
Australia were also export destinations. To some extent, these smuggling cases supplied evidence 
that China was not only a source country, but also a transit country for worldwide chemical 
distribution. 
 
Occupational offenders 
Occupational crimes are ‘offences committed by individuals for themselves in the course of their 
occupation’ and ‘offences by employers against their employees or the corporation’ (Quinney 
1964). On this basis, occupational offenders in this research are individuals who commit 
occupational crimes. Offenders in G2 were categorised as occupational offenders because they 
were employees in chemical, pharmaceutical and biotech companies who violated legal codes in 
the course of activity in legitimate occupations to sell chemicals for their own interests (Ward 
1994). The profiles of occupational offenders were distinguished from the other two groups in 
terms of number of members, men, women, highest educational background, chemicals and 
quantity. Although the most frequently reported education level was high school, the proportion 
of individuals with higher education was greater. Most cases in this group engaged in supplying 
other chemicals, such as hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid, which were used in manufacturing 
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units rather than for drug production. However, there were also 39 cases in which occupational 
offenders illicitly sold ephedrine and hydroxylamine hydrochloride for methamphetamine and 
ketamine production, respectively. The quantity of chemicals involved seemed to be larger than 
in G1 but smaller than in G3. 
 
The scales in this group showed no significant differences compared to the other two groups. 
However, unlike with lower-class offenders, relationships between members in this group 
appeared more likely to be business partnerships based primarily on the common goal of 
monetary gain. Existing relationships such as friendships and kinship might provide added value 
to a partnership, but the most important concern was money. Like occupational crimes in other 
fields, embezzlement was also commonly committed by employees and unqualified purchasers 
(Qin and Fang 2006)—namely, by insiders and by insider/outsider partnerships (Ward 1994). 
Embezzlement took two forms. One epidemic practice was that insiders advertised their products 
on websites to attract outsiders who have difficulty applying for purchasing licenses.9 After 
establishing partnerships, a common practice was ‘excessive compensation’ for insiders who took 
advantage of their occupations to broker transactions between chemical companies and 
outsiders by providing false licences for company leaders and regulators. In this case, neither 
company leaders nor licence regulators could recognise the illicit activities based on the 
documents presented. These transactions ostensibly appeared to be normal business activities 
between companies and their buyers. Therefore, it is unsurprising that such illicit transactions 
were difficult to detect. The other insider/outsider deal was that insiders directly embezzled and 
sold chemicals to outsiders. Both practices were commonly observed in the cases collected. 
 
Corporate offenders 
Corporate crimes are ‘offences committed by corporate officials for their corporation and 
offences of the corporation itself’ (Ward 1994). On this basis, in G3, corporate offenders refers to 
representatives and their employees within medical, chemical and biotech companies. Some of 
them produced chemicals legitimately but deliberately engaged in the illicit supply of chemicals. 
There were also some companies established to illegitimately produce and sell chemicals without 
approval licences (Wang 2014; Zhang and Liu 2014). 
 
As demonstrated in the results, offender profiles for this group were quite different from the 
other two groups. The most noticeable differences were the higher education backgrounds and 
occupations, both suggesting relatively high social status and income. Another significant 
difference was noticed between the three scales regarding young adults. For example, the number 
of young adults in S3 was significantly higher than in S1 and S2, which may suggest that the large 
scale of members is quite attractive to young adults in this group. In the collected cases, 102 
companies were involved in the illicit supply of controlled chemicals. Among them, the most 
frequent chemicals supplied were hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid, followed by ephedrine 
and hydroxylamine hydrochloride. There were two types of transactions between corporations 
and their clients. One was to produce chemicals legitimately but sell them illegally, while the other 
was to produce and sell chemicals illegally. Both were conducted in many forms. For example, 
corporations might advertise their products on websites to attract local and international clients, 
while in other cases, purchase orders noting the specific chemicals needed were sent to chemical 
companies in advance. After receiving them, corporations would produce chemicals that were 
subsequently transported through logistics companies. The illicit activities were normally 
conducted by company executives or representatives, and the illegitimate business activity was 
well known to most staff members. Essentially, in such cases, it is the company itself colluding 
with its clients, which poses considerable challenges to chemical regulation and drug supply 
reduction. 
 
Unlike lower-class offenders and occupational offenders, another feature of corporate offenders 
was the hierarchical structure among members, which was measured by the following facets. 
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First, the division of labour was markedly different from the temporary and unclear division of 
labour in G1 and G2. In this group, the roles of different members were quite clear and routinised. 
The managers or representatives were responsible for decision-making regarding company 
operations, while employees performed their functions of developing new substances, 
communicating with clients and transporting chemicals. Second, the structure based on the 
bureaucracy embedded in the internal structure of the companies was stabilised. This appears to 
be similar to the bureaucracy model of criminal organisations, which are characterised by a single 
leader, a defined hierarchy, an extensive division of labour, rigidity, impersonality and various 
subordinate roles (Le 2012). For example: 
 
Case 2:10 During September and November 2013, the deputy general manager of the defendant 
asked the representative for consent to sell chemicals to another company that had no purchasing 
licences. With the approval, the deputy general manager supervised and urged employees in the 
quality, marketing and administrative departments to close the deal. A total of 90.3 tonnes of mixed 
xylene were sold. 
 
Discussion 
 
The significant differences among the three groups of offenders and their specific patterns 
regarding the supply of chemicals suggest a diverse, dynamic and complex chemical supply 
network in China. Many Chinese scholars have argued that monetary gain is these offenders’ 
primary motivation (Huang et al. 2012; Yang and Tian 2000; Yao 2015), which provides some 
reasonable explanations for the prevalence of lower-class offenders in the supply chains. 
However, this perspective has limitations for understanding the involvement of staff and 
representatives who have relatively high social status and stable incomes. For example, why do 
staff and managers risk their lives and reputations to pursue more profit by supplying chemicals 
illicitly? To understand the behaviours of the three types of offenders, we refer to the penetration 
of the market economy into cultural goals, regulation system and polity, which generates value 
orientations that emphasise efficiency norms at the expense of moral considerations. This 
produces weak noneconomic institutions that are less capable of providing stakes in conformity 
in the form of meaningful social roles (Savolainen 2000). 
 
Cultural goals 
Relative importance has been attached to the status symbols of money and personal, family or 
business reputations to understand criminal behaviours in different social classes (Clinard, 
Quinney and Wildeman 2014; Messner and Rosenfeld 2012). Two important goals are closely 
related to money and reputation in Confucianism: wealth and nobility.11 Wealth refers to material 
success, while nobility means spiritual success and includes high virtue and prestige. In 
traditional Confucianism, wealth and nobility are not closely related. However, there are some 
changes regarding the two goals because of the penetration of the rapidly developing market 
economy. First, wealth has been greatly emphasised in the market economy. For example, after 
the Great Leap Forward in the 1960s, China was in extreme poverty. Therefore, along with the 
‘open door’ policy, the ideology of ‘first rich and common rich’—which reflects a belief that some 
people should become rich first to help the region and other individuals become commonly rich—
has been greatly advanced (Cheng and Liu 2012). Accruing wealth is not only the aim of 
individuals; it is also a national goal. Therefore, there were few regulations on economic and 
financial activities in the early 1990s, even though some of the activities were illicit (Liu 2007). 
The benefits of this lack of regulation are obvious, as the number of wealthy people has 
increased,12 but the remaining individuals have not been similarly developed. Therefore, it is 
possible that some lower-class individuals are culturally motivated to become rich to sustain a 
better life. As suggested by Huang et al. (2012), an offender’s occupation is significantly 
associated with all drug offences. In particular, being a farmer increases both odds for smuggling 
and transporting drugs due to the low income of that occupation. 
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The second change is that there appears to be close relationships between wealth and nobility, 
and even a shift from ‘wealth and nobility’ to ‘wealth is noble’. In this case, some individuals may 
not be satisfied with their material lives; rather, they might also want to be noble, which can be 
achieved in modern culture through greater wealth (Shen 2000). Thus, modern Chinese values 
seem to promote personal economic ambition, material achievement and individualism (Liu 
2004), which encourages individuals to pursue greater wealth to fulfil the foremost goal. As a 
result, the goal of wealth overwhelms other goals and becomes the principal measuring rod for 
achievements (Messner and Rosenfeld 2012). This motivates individuals to turn to other 
legitimate, or illegitimate but efficient, ways to become rich. Additionally, current legal markets 
for business have been monopolised by state enterprises, millionaires, some government officials 
and their privileged generations (Chu and Jin 2015; Li 2016; Wei and Liu 2014). This further 
limits the availability of legitimate means for entrepreneurs, and even more for individuals, to 
realise their goals. Hence, as supported by both quantitative and qualitative results, staff, 
managers and representatives are more frequently related to the illicit supply of other chemicals 
for production needs rather than to precursor chemicals for drug production. In their opinion, 
the illicit supply of chemicals is regarded as ‘not morally wrong’, a ‘grey area’, an ‘easy way’, 
involving ‘less risk’, and ‘an efficient way to make more money to be nobility’.13 As suggested by 
Clinard, Quinney and Wildeman (2014), occupational offenders do not usually conceive of 
themselves as criminals; they accept conventional values and attempt to seek a greater share of 
the rewards in the conventional world. 
 
Regulation system 
In the early 1990s, with the aim of accelerating economic development, many priorities, such as 
location advantages, policy support and tax incentives, were allocated in the chemical 
manufacturing industry. Due to the reordered priorities, there were few regulations on the supply 
of chemicals, with the exception of the illicit supply of acetic anhydride, ether, chloroform and any 
other raw material or elixir for drug production that was criminalised by law in 1997. As a result 
of these incentives from national and local authorities, and fewer interventions in the market, the 
last decade has witnessed a steady rise in the market scale (from ¥ 1.62 trillion to ¥ 8.77 trillion) 
and in the number of producers, such as enterprises above designated size, small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and individual producers. Thus, the chemical industry has been one of 
the Chinese economy’s pillar industries. However, there have been many problems concerning 
the regulation of production and usage. For example, the pattern of growth in the chemical 
production industry is extensive rather than intensive, in particular for SMEs and individual 
producers, which poses many risks for the diversion of the chemicals. By 2005, China had 
produced or imported more than 45,000 kinds of chemicals, some of which have been banned or 
severely restricted internationally and in developed countries, but are still produced and used 
domestically (CCICED 2006). In response, the Regulation on the Administration of Precursor 
Chemicals, the first systematic regulation for normalising the production, operation, purchase, 
transport, import and export of chemicals, was enacted in 2005 to prevent the diversion of 
chemicals to drug production. It established an administrative approval system for the 
production, operation, purchase, transport, import and export of controlled chemicals. Violation 
of the regulation is punishable under criminal law. Since then, 27 chemicals have been banned at 
the national level. 
 
However, the penetration of the market economy into the regulation system has generated weak 
regulations on normalising supply behaviours (Messner and Rosenfeld 2012). First, the market 
economy requires a free enterprise system in which goods and services are exchanged freely in 
an open market, while regulation, to a large extent, limits the operation of chemical 
manufacturing companies through a strictly administrative approval system. For example, under 
the system, all producers need approved licenses for chemical production. However, Qin and Zhao 
(2007) found that many chemical producers find the approval system strict, cumbersome and 
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bureaucratic, which, in turn, affects the autonomy and flexibility of the operations of their 
companies. As a result, some chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies, 
especially individuals and small companies encountering difficulties in applying for licences in 
local administrative departments, may continue to produce and sell chemicals without licences. 
This may contribute to a rapid increase in the number of chemical-related cases (from 140 in 
2004 to 504 in 2005), and in the number of chemical companies on which administration 
penalties were imposed (Qiu 2006). 
 
Second, the market economy encourages greater supply when there is demand, while the 
regulation system emphasises strict management in the entire production process and 
consequently limits the supply. Therefore, unqualified purchasers have no legal channels to 
obtain chemicals, while chemical manufacturing companies have many products in stores. As 
results, some staff and experts in chemical companies with a lack of management in storage may 
be attracted by the profits and sell chemicals to unauthorised individuals and companies. Such 
conflict seems to be relevant to the cases in G2, in which producers have licences but there is a 
lack of regulation governing storage, sales and transportation. As a result, chemicals are sold by 
staff, which indicates passive involvement of the companies themselves. Thus, conflicts between 
the market economy and the regulation system suggest that it is the regulation system that 
‘creates’ delinquency and ‘forces’ the involvement of chemical companies in the supply patterns 
(Qin and Fang 2006). 
 
Political contexts 
In contrast to the highly centralised political system of the People’s Republic of China, the central 
government began to decentralise the fiscal system in 1980, so that central and local governments 
could share fiscal revenues to motivate local officials to lend a ‘helping hand’ in advancing local 
economic growth (Jin, Qian and Winegast 2005). With the deepening market economy, political 
institutions, especially local governments, were further penetrated and deeply affected by 
economic institutions. Since 1990, local government officials have increasingly played various 
active roles in building local infrastructure, encouraging local businesses and attracting foreign 
investment to develop the local economy. Many scholars have noted that the readiness of the 
Chinese central government to reward or punish local officials is mainly based on how their 
economic performance motivates them to promote the local economy (Blanchard and Shleifer 
2001; Li and Zhou 2005). Consequently, local economic development has been closely linked with 
the promotion system, and has correspondingly become a main concern for local officials (Yu 
2015). This creates a dilemma regarding economic development and the regulation of chemical 
enterprises. As responses, local officials prefer to use fewer administrative regulations to provide 
more space for companies and their business activities to develop (Yu 2016). Subsequently, local 
economies develop, revenues grow quickly and local officials have increased opportunities for 
promotion (He and Sun 2012), which appears to be mutually beneficial. 
 
However, after China’s regulation of precursor chemicals in 2005 and subsequent amendments 
in 2016 and 2017, substantial amounts of precursor chemicals have been rejected for export due 
to the absence of licences and the diversion of chemicals into drug production. According to a 
recent report, the chemicals rejected by Chinese authorities for export increased from 569,000 kg 
in 2006 to 2,562,000 kg in 2016 (NNCCC 2017). It is possible that the regulation system largely 
damages local revenue growth and hinders the promotion of local officials further. Therefore, 
local officials, while showing enthusiasm for implementing the drug policy and using law 
enforcement to crack down on illicit supply cases, conversely, may allow the operation of 
chemical companies even when they have committed unit crimes. This may partly explain why 
some managers and representatives in the cases examined committed an offence related to the 
illicit supply of precursor chemicals and were sentenced to jail, but the companies they 
represented remained in operation. 
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Conclusion 
 
Our study demonstrated that the frequent involvement of occupational offenders and chemical 
companies in the illicit distribution of precursor chemicals makes the chemical supply pattern 
diverse and complex. However, certain fixed patterns have been identified through this research. 
First, ephedrine was the most frequent precursor chemical in the collected cases, which is 
consistent with methamphetamine being the most commonly used drug in China. Second, lower-
class individuals comprise the majority of offenders and are more closely involved with 
ephedrine, while chemical companies are commonly involved with hydrochloric acid and other 
chemicals. This suggests that members of the lower class and small-scale producers may be the 
primary chemicals suppliers for drug production. Finally, China is not only a source country, but 
also a key transit nation for certain chemicals. Based on an aspect of IAT—the penetration of the 
market economy into other institutions generating deviance for certain groups of individuals—
this research further reveals the imbalance between the economy and culture, polity and law at a 
macro level. This may provide some foundations for understanding this phenomenon. 
 
This study has several limitations. The first concerns the database we used and the cases we 
collected. The database, China Judgments Online, was established by the Supreme People’s Court 
of the People’s Republic of China in 2013 and is maintained by the court. Although most effective 
judicial documents are uploaded into the database, not all documents are. Meanwhile, we limited 
our cases to two offences—illicit transaction in and the smuggling of precursor chemicals—which 
did not capture the cases that were labelled as drug-related crimes under paragraph 214 Article 
350 of the criminal law. Therefore, the data collected was not exhaustive. It is also worth noting 
that the three groups of chemicals in closed cases should not be considered indicators of the most 
recent supply patterns because they only represented some common chemicals in the input 
market. Many precursor chemicals used for NPS were not included. The results should be 
understood as minimum values in terms of the number of categorised distributors, types of 
chemicals and existing supply routes because the data were drawn from court files instead of 
from the law enforcement monitoring system. Finally, the application of market economy 
penetration under IAT has not been fully tested in Chinese society. Future research can do more 
to measure economic, cultural, political and legal contexts at both macro and micro levels in 
China. 
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1 It was not controlled until 2014 in China. 
2 Article 4 of The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issuance of Judgments on the Internet by the People’s 
Courts (2013) states that: 
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An effective judicial document of a people’s court should be issued on the Internet, except under any 
of the following circumstances: (1) It involves any state secret or individual privacy; (2) it involves 
juvenile’s crimes; (3) mediation cases; (4) others that are not appropriate to be issued on the 
Internet. 
3 The database was established in 2013. Since then, all new sentencing files have been uploaded into the database. 
However, there are also sentencing files from 2012, which were also uploaded by some courts. Therefore, with the aim 
of including most cases, we collected all cases from 2012 to September 2017. 
4 Article 350 of the Criminal Law states: ‘Whoever, in violation of the provisions of the state, illegally produces, trades in, 
transports or carries into or out of China acetic anhydride, ethyl ether, chloroform, or other raw materials or auxiliary 
materials that can be used for manufacturing drugs shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not more than three years, 
criminal detention or surveillance in addition to a fine if the circumstances are relatively serious; if the circumstances 
are serious, be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years in addition to a 
fine; or if the circumstances are especially serious, be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than seven years in 
addition to a fine or forfeiture of property. Whoever, being obviously aware that someone else is manufacturing drugs, 
produces, trades in or transports the articles as provided for in the preceding paragraph for the said person shall be 
punished as an accomplice to the crime of drug manufacturing’. 
5 Case references: (2014) 郓刑初字第80号 and（2015）汀刑初字第221号. 
6 Case reference: (2015) 顺刑初字第3号. 
7 Cases reference: (2014) 赣刑初字第57号, （2015）鄂茅箭刑初字第00145号. 
8 Cases reference: (2016) 闽0212刑初234号. 
9 Case reference: (2014) 温乐刑初字第739号. 
10 Case reference: (2015) 临刑初字第75号. 
11 The Master said, ‘Riches and nobilitys are what men desire. If they cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should 
not be held. Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. If they cannot be avoided in the proper way, they should not 
be avoided’ (Confucian Analects). 
12 China has the second-most millionaires worldwide after the United States. What makes this even more astonishing is 
how quickly the number of Chinese millionaires has increased. However, poverty is still a pressing issue for China and 
one of the major concerns of the Chinese government (Wildau and Mitchell 2016). 
13 Case references: (2014) 三刑初字第00137号; (2016)苏0582刑初633号; (2015) 锡法刑初字第00507号. 
14 Translation: Whoever smuggles, traffics, transports or manufactures the substances mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, while clearly knowing that the person manufactures narcotic drugs, shall be regarded as a joint offender in 
the crime of manufacturing narcotic drugs and punished as such. 
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